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THE RIGHT TO "NO TRIAL" AND THE RIGHT TO
"NO COUNSEL"
INTRODUCTION
During the spring of 1968, two shocking crimes occurred in this
country-the murders of Dr. Martin Luther King and Senator Robert
F. Kennedy.1 On March 10, 1969, James Earl Ray, the accused assassin
of Dr. King, pleaded guilty to the charge of first-degree murder and was
sentenced to ninety-nine years imprisonment by a Tennessee court. A
California court, however, refused the request of Sirhan Sirhan, the
accused murderer of Senator Kennedy, to dismiss his counsel and plead
guilty; Sirhan was subsequently found guilty and was sentenced to death.
The purpose of this note is not to evaluate the prosecutions of
Sirhan or Ray, but to discuss certain constitutional issues which arose
from the action of the court in denying Sirhan's requests. The principle
questions involved are whether a defendant has a constitutional right to
waive a trial by pleading guilty and whether a defendant has a constitu-
tional right to waive counsel and appear pro se.'
It may appear paradoxical to speak of a right to "no trial" and a
right to "no counsel" at a time when our system of justice is taking steps
to assure all defendants a fair trial and to provide counsel for the indigent
defendants. The right to "no trial" and the right to "no counsel," however,
in no way infringe upon a defendant's right to trial and right to counsel.
The right to trial and right to counsel refer to the assurances that a trial
and counsel will be available to a defendant if he so desires. However,
there may be situations where a defendant will decide that he does not
want to go through the procedure of a trial or does not want to be
represented by counsel. It is in these situations that the right to "no
trial" and the right to "no counsel" become important.
THE RIGHT TO "No TRIAL"
The Right to Trial
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant his right to a trial
1. The New York Times is the source used for all information concerning James
Earl Ray and Sirhan Sirhan.
2. Pro se is defined as : "For himself; in his own behalf; in person." BLACK's LAW
DICrONARY 1364 (4th ed. 1951).
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by jury.' In Patton v. United States,4 the Supreme Court interpreted
"trial by jury" as referring to
a trial . . . as understood and applied at common law, and
. . . including the essential elements as they were recognized
in this country and England when the Constitution was
adopted..... Those elements were-(1) that the jury should
consist of twelve men, neither more nor less; (2) that the trial
should be in the presence and under the superintendence of
a judge... ; and (3) that the vedrict should be unanimous.5
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state: "Cases to
be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury
trial . . ."
In the federal courts, the right to trial by jury entitles the defendant
to be tried by twelve jurors. All state constitutions afford a defendant the
right to trial by jury. Since the Sixth Amendment has never been made
directly applicable to the states,' however, the right of a state to limit the
size of the jury to less than twelve has been upheld.8 Thus, a question
arises as to whether a defendant has the right to request a trial by jury
where the number of jurors is less than that prescribed by the particular
constitution. Although Patton affirmed the right of a defendant to submit
to a trial by a jury of less than twelve or a trial by the court,9 the Court
indicated that a trial by a jury of twelve was the normal and preferable
mode." In accordance with the Patton decision, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure afford a defendant the right to waive a trial by jury1 '
and allows the parties to consent to a jury of less than twelve persons.12
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, also provides:
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;
and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crime shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.
4. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
5. Id. at 288.
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
7. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 19 (1968).
8. E.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
9. 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930).
10. We do not mean to hold that the waiver must be put into effect at all
events. . . . Trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases.
Id.
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL RULES]. The defendant
must have the "approval of the court and the consent of the government" to waive a jury
trial. Id.
12. FEDERAL RULES 23(b). This rule requires that both parties so stipulate and
that it be done with the approval of the court.
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The Sixth Amendment warrants that "the accused shall enjoy the
right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury ... ."" If this language is
literally interpreted, a defendant could never waive a trial by jury. It has
been well established, however, that a defendant has the right to waive
both a "speedy trial"' and a "public trial."'" If a defendant has the right
to waive a "speedy" and a "public" trial, rights which the Sixth Amend-
ment states that he "shall enjoy," it would also seem that he should have
the right to waive a trial by jury.
Although most states provide, by constitutional or statutory pro-
vision, that a defendant has the right to waive a trial by jury, 6 qualifica-
tions are placed upon this right of waiver. Some states allow a waiver
regardless of the nature of the crime, 7 while others will not allow a
waiver when the crime is punishable by death. I" Still others allow a
waiver only when the crime is less than a felony."
The right to trial by jury is a personal right for the protection of
the defendant, and, therefore, no qualification should be placed upon his
right to waive a trial if he so desires." The right to waive a trial should
not be denied on the ground that it would be against public policy, since
the trial is designed for the protection of the accused rather than the
public.21
Right to Waive Trial by Pleading Guilty
Generally, a defendant in' a criminal prosecution has three pleas
available to him:2 1) not guilty;"2 2) guilty;4 and 3) nolo conten-
dere.2" The inquiry here is restricted to pleas of guilty. Although it has
been said that a plea of nolo contendere has the same effect as a plea of
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. Annot.. 57 A.L.R.2d 307 (1958).
15. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1452 (1956).




20. See 21 AM. JUR. 2d Crim. Law § 219 (1965).
21. In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), the Supreme Court said:
"'The view that the power to waive a trial by jury . . . should be denied on grounds
of public policy must be rejected as unsound." Id. at 308.
22. E.g., FEDERAL RULES 11.
23. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2d Crim. Law § 467 (1965); 22 C.J.S. Crim. Law
§§ 450-54 (1961).
24. See generally 21 Ai. JUR. 2d Crim. Law §§ 484-96 (1965); 22 C.J.S. Crim.
Law §§ 422(1)-27(7) (1961).
25. See generally 21 AM. JUE. 2d Crim. Law §§ 497-502 (1965) ; Annot., 89 A.L.R.
2d 540 (1963). This plea is sometimes referred to as non vult, non vult contendere or
nolle contendere.
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guilty,26 the similarity is confined to the case in which the plea is entered.
While a plea of guilty may be used against the defendant in a subsequent
criminal or civil proceeding, a plea of nolo contendere may not be used
in a subsequent proceeding.. Because of the difference in the subsequent
effect of the two pleas, the courts have been vested with greater powers of
discretion in accepting pleas of nolo contendere.27
While the Sixth Amendment's right to a trial by jury has not been
made directly applicable to the states,2" the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment assures a defendant of the right to a trial before
conviction. Although the defendant may waive the trial by pleading
guilty, such a power of waiver is not extended to the states. The state
may neither deny the defendant his right to trial nor force the defendant
to plead guilty to the charged offense. If the court may not force the
defendant to plead guilty, should it have the power to force him to plead
not guilty if he has intelligently and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty and
the court has informed him of the consequences of such a plea? Should the
court have the right-regardless of the statutory power granted to it-
to reject the plea of guilty, enter a plea of not guilty and force the
defendant to stand trial ?
A minority of three states give their courts the absolute power to
reject a plea of guilty to capital offenses. The New Jersey courts are
vested, by statute, with an in toto power of rejection.29 In Louisiana"0
and New York"' the defendant is forced to plead not guilty unless the
26. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961); United States v. Lair, 195 F.2d
658 (8th Cir. 1912) ; Ellsworth v. State, 258 Wis. 636, 46 N.W.2d 746 (1951). See also
21 AM. Ju. 2d Crim. Law 501 (1965).
27. See, e.g., FEDERAL RULES 11: ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTC E, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 1.1 (b) (Tent. Draft 1967)
[hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT, PLEAS OF GUILTY]. See also Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d
540 (1963).
28. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO TRIAL DY JURY 19 (1968).
29. In no case shall the plea of guilty be received upon any indictment for
murder, and if, upon arraignment, such a plea is offered, it shall be disregarded-
and the plea of not guilty entered.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-3 (1953).
30. A court shall not receive an unqualified plea of guilty in a capital case.
If a defendant makes such a plea, the court shall order a plea of not guilty en-
tered for him. The defendant, with the consent of the district attorney, may
plead "guilty without capital punishment."
LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 557 (West 1967).
31. A conviction shall not be had upon a plea of guilty where the crime charged
is murder, except upon consent of the court and district attorney to the entry
of such plea.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 332 (1967). The allowance of a plea of guilty with the con-
sent of the court and the district attorney is a recent amendment to the New York
statute. See N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 332 (1957) for the content of the statute before
amendment.
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court and the district attorney are willing to acquiesce to the defendant's
requested plea.
It seems unquestionable that a defendant who enters a plea of guilty
is entitled to the protection of a court's inquiry as to whether the plea is
intelligent and voluntary. The power of rejection in Louisiana, New
Jersey and New York, however, is not grounded upon such an inquiry.
By statute, these states have reworded the Sixth Amendment. They
disregard the import of the wording that the defendant shall enjoy the
right to a trial and consider a trial as being sine qua non.
To Whom Is Protection Extended by the Prohibition of Pleas of Guilty?
Protection of the Defendant
The obvious answer is that the prohibition of guilty pleas to capital
offenses is for the protection of the defendant. Yet, a guilty plea should
indicate to the court that he does not want such protection. Assuming that
the court, in its preliminary inquiry, is assured that the plea is voluntarily
and intelligently given, and that the defendant is sane and is not motivated
by a self-punitive act of confession, the possibility of a death sentence
should substantially eliminate the danger of a defendant pleading guilty
to first-degree murder if he did not commit the crime.
There may be factors other than the defendant's sense of guilt that
will prompt him to plead guilty. He may wish to forego the often ago-
nizing and tedious proceedings 'of a trial or he may desire to prevent a
public display of facts or occurrences which might prove embarrassing to
himself, his family or his friends. He might also plead guilty in the hope
that the court will be lenient in prescribing punishment.
Regardless of the factors prompting the defendant to plead guilty,
the court's duty to protect the defendant should end once it informs him
of the consequences of his plea and is satisfied that his plea is intelligently,
competently and voluntarily given.
Protection of the Public
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant the right to a
"public trial." If this were a right of the public, it would necessarily
follow that the right to a "speedy trial" is also a public right. Accordingly,
the state, acting for the public, would be able to force a defendant to accept
both a public and a speedy trial. This result would seem contrary to the
language of the Sixth Amendment. In In re Oliver,2 the Supreme Court
stated that the right to a "public trial" is a guarantee of the accused3"
32. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
33. Id. at 266.
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which is intended to "safeguard against any attempt to employ our cofirts
as instruments of persecution. 84 If a defendant wants to forego the
ordeal of having a public audience present at his trial, he should not be
prevented from doing so. Nor should he be forced to stand trial if he
desires to plead guilty and accept the consequences.
The right to trial is available to all members of our society, but only
accused individuals within the mass should be allowed to assert that
right. It is a right intended for the protection of the accused and is
guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the right is granted for the
protection of the defendant, there seems to be no reason why he cannot
intelligently, competently and voluntarily waive that right. Such a waiver
would not be against public policy on the grounds that it would allow a
defendant to escape punishment. By pleading guilty, a defendant is
submitting himself to the court for punishment. Neither can it be argued
that such a plea will suppress vital facts, since a plea of guilty does not
prevent the state from making further investigations.
Protection of the Court
From what is the court protecting itself when it refuses to accept a
defendant's plea of guilty? Should the right to a trial, which was
originally intended as an instrument to protect the defendant from an
unscrupulous court, be manipulated by the court to provide protection for
the court ? Of course, criticism might be leveled at the court for sentencing
a defendant to death solely on the basis of a guilty plea. Yet, the same
furor might arise even if a defendant were found guilty after a trial, not
because of the means used to determine his guilt, but because of the
punishment imposed upon him.
The court should not be allowed to force a defendant to stand trial
as a display of its fairness and justice. The trial should be designed to
protect a defendant who professes his innocence rather than to protect the
court from criticism and the possibility of reversal.
Circumstances Under Which a Defendant Should Be Allowed to Plead
Guilty
States which bar a defendant from pleading guilty have restricted
this prohibition to capital offenses.3" Undoubtedly, this is due to the
severity of the possible punishment. 6 While death by asphyxiation.
34. Id. at 270.
35. See notes 29-31 supra.
36. See LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 557 (West 1967) which allows the defen-
dant to plead "guilty without punishment" with the consent of the district attorney.
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electrocution or hanging is a most undesirable fate, it is questionable
whether interment for a long period of time in a penal institution is any
more desirable. Thus, it would seem that the gravity of the crime or the
severity of the punishment would not be valid criteria for determing
whether to accept a defendant's plea of guilty. If the protection provided
by a trial is essential to prosecutions for capital offenses, then it must also
be essential to all felony prosecutions. The degree of possible punishment
should not be the sole determining factor.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure17 and the ABA Project on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice"8 provide ample guidelines for
the state courts in determining whether to accept a defendant's plea of
guilty. The Federal Rules allow a defendant to plead not guilty,"9 guilty"°
or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere.4 The ABA Project
allows the same pleas as the Federal Rules,4 2 except that the plea of
nolo contendere is not available unless provided for by the law of the
particular state."3
Neither the Federal Rules nor the ABA Project provide for a
rejection of a guilty plea because of the gravity of the crime or the
severity of the punishment. Before a guilty plea can be accepted, both the
Federal Rules and the ABA Project require that the court: 1) determine
whether the plea of guilty is voluntarily made;" 2) address the defendant
personally and determine whether the defendant understands the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea of guilty;45 and 3) deter-
37. FEDERAL RULES 11.
38. ABA PROJECT, PLEAS OF GUILTY.
39. FEDERAL RULES 11.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. ABA PROJECT, PLEAS OF GUILTY §§ 1.1 (a), 1.1 (b).
43. ABA PROJECT. PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.1(a).
44. FEDERAL RULES 11; ABA PROJECT, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.5.
45. FEDERAL RULES 11 : ABA PROJECT, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.4. Section 1.4 of the
ABA PROJECT provides:
The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo conteiderc from a
defendant without first addressing the defendant personally and
(a) determining that he understands the nature of the charge;
(b) informing him that by his plea of guilty or nolo contendere he waives
his right to trial by jury; and
(c) informing him:
(i) of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including
that possible from consecutive sentences:
(ii) of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge:
and
(iii) when the offense charged is one for which a different or addi-
tional punishment is authorized by reason of the fact that the defendant
has previously been convicted of an offense, that this fact may be
established after his plea in the present action if he has been previously
convicted, thereby subjecting him to such different or additional punish-
ment.
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mine whether there is a factual basis for such plea." If the above criteria
are satisfied, the court should accept the plea of guilty. On the other hand,
if the court determines that the plea is involuntary, that the defendant does
not comprehend the nature of the charge or the consequences of the
plea or that there is no factual basis for the plea, the plea will be rejected.
While the court must assure a defendant of his right to trial, it
should not force a trial upon a defendant who wishes to plead guilty. By
following the guidelines enunciated by the Federal Rules and the ABA
Project, the courts will be able to better perserve the defendant's right to
trial without encroaching upon his right to plead guilty.
THE RIGHT TO "No COuNSEL"
The Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence." Because of a lack of formal debate when this amendment was
first proposed,47 it was difficult to determine the intended application of
the amendment."8 In 1938, the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst" determined
the application of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. The Court
averred:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." This is one of the safe-
guards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure
fundamental human rights of life and liberty. Omitted from the
Constitution as originally adopted, provisions of this and other
amendments were submitted . . . as essential barriers against
arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights."
In accordance with the Court's decision in Johnson, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide:
Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall
be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every
Id. The ABA PROJECT is much more explicit as to what is required of the court than
are the FEDERAL RULES.
46. FEDERAL RULES 11; ABA PROJECT, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.6.
47. W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27 (1955).
48. Without any records of debates surrounding the proposal of the Sixth Amend-
ment, the courts were unable to conduct historical analysis such as they were able to do
in cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment. See Betts v. Brady. 316 U.S. 455 (1942)
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
49. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
50. Id. at 462.
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stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the
commissioner or court through appeal, unless he waives such
appointment."
Since Johnson was originally decided in a federal court, the rule
enunciated therein had no effect on state court proceedings. In Powell v.
Alabama,'2 the Court held that the failure of a state court to appoint
counsel was a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.5 3 The Court, however, restricted its holding by stating: [W]het-
her this would be so in other prosecutions, or under other. circumstances,
we need not determine." 4 Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady,"6 the Court
declared that the "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial." 6 The Court concluded that they were "unable
to say that the concept of due process . . . obligates the States . .. to
furnish counsel in every such case."
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel was not
applicable to state courts until the decision of Gideon v. Wainwright.5"
Reversing its holding in Betts, 9 the Court held that the right to counsel
is a fundamental right made applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment."0
In light of judicial recognition of the right to counsel, the question
remains of whether the defendant must accept the assistance of counsel
when he wishes to appear in court pro se. Gideon was not addressed to
this question. Therefore, if the right of waiver does exist, the problem
to be determined is whether the right is implicit in the Sixth Amendment,
and therefore applicable to the states through the Fourteenth, or whether
the right must be created by statute.
The Right to Waive Counsel
In Johnson v. Zerbst,6' the Court said that when the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel "is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is
no longer a necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to
51. FEDERAL RULES 44(a).
52. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ....
54. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
55. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
56. Id. at 459.
57. Id.
58. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
59. The Court agreed that Betts was "an anachronism when handed down." Id. at
345.
60. Id. at 342.
61. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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conviction and sentence." 62 Subsequently, in Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann,63 the Court held that the accused may "competently and
intelligently waive his Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.""
The Court further asserted:
The right to the assistance of counsel and the correlative
right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms.
They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an
accused's position before the law .... But the Constitution does
not force a lawyer upon a defendant.6"
The right of a defendant to conduct his own defense was further defined
in United States v. Plattner :6"
A defendant in the trial of a criminal case . . . has a
right to conduct and manage his own case pro se.... Moreover,
we hold the right to act pro se as above stated is a right arising
out of the Federal Constitution and not the mere product of
legislation or judicial decision.
This safeguard [the Sixth Amendment right to the as-
sistance of counsel] was surely not intended to limit in any way
the absolute and primary right to conduct one's own defense
in propria persona.
67
Accompanying the cases which mention the correlative constitutional
right to waive the assistance of counsel is a similar right of statutory
origin. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that if the
defendant is unable to obtain counsel and appears without counsel, the
court will appoint counsel "unless he waives such appointment."6 The
United States Code also states that "in all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally. ... "69
Yet, the right to waive the assistance of counsel would exist even in
the absence of statutory decrees. The defendant's right to waive the
assistance of counsel is analogous to a defendant's correlative rights not
to be a witness against himself and "to be a witness against himself,"7
and his correlative rights to a trial by jury and "to waive a trial by
62. Id. at 468.
63. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
64. Id. at 275.
65. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
66. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
67. Id. at 273-74.
68. FEDERAL RULES 44(a).
69. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
70. United States v. Pile, 256 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1958).
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jury."' 71 If a defendant has the right to waive a "speedy and public trial,"
which is also guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment,7 2 it would
seem that he should also have the right to waive the assistance of counsel.
Competency to Waive the Assistance of Counsel
In Johnson v. Zerbst,73 the Court held that the defendant must
"competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. ' 74 This holding
raises the questions of what is meant by a competent and intelligent
waiver, and who is to determine whether the waiver was competent and
intelligent. The Johnson opinion indicated that the determination of
whether there has been a "competent and intelligent" waiver depends
"upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, in-
cluding the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. ' ' 7. One
can readily understand why the courts feel compelled to require a
standard of competency, but it is questionable whether the ad hoc test
used in Johnson provides a meaningful standard. Under this standard,
cases allowing a waiver of counsel have varied from one where the
defendant had formal legal training,76 to one where the defendant was an
ex-convict with little education. 7' By requiring a high degree of pro-
fessional competency," the courts may be expressing their preference
toward members of the bar. By applying a "sliding" standard of com-
petency, a court can greatly restrict a defendant's right to appear pro se.
In Von Moltke v. Gillies,7 1 the Supreme Court held that a waiver
is valid if it is
made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the
statutory offenses included under them, the range of allowable
punishment thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and
circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential
to a broad understanding of the whole matter.8"
71. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). See also Yates v. United States,
316 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1963).
72. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
73. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
74. Id. at 469. See also United States v. Kniess, 264 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1959).
75. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945).
76. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
77. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 239 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
78. Referral is made to the requirement that the defendant have knowledge of, or
experience with, legal proceedings. Although "legal" competency seemed more apropos,
this note is not intended to give the impression that reference is made to the competency
of the defendant to stand trial.
79. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
80. Id. at 724.
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If a defendant is informed of, and understands, the consequences of his
waiver, the waiver is deemed to be competent, intelligent, voluntary and,
therefore, valid.
Thus, the burden is on the court to determine whether a defendant
will be allowed to conduct his own defense."' Is the court the proper
participant in the legal process to determine whether a defendant may
appear pro se? The courts may be interested parties in the litigation
because of their fear that criticism would result from allowing a defendant
to appear pro se. There may be cases, especially those in which the public
interest has been inflamed, where a court will impose a high standard of
competency and force the defendant to accept the assistance of counsel.
By attempting to protect its own reputation for fairness and justice, the
court would be forcing the defendant to relinquish his right to defend
himself. The courts need not surrender their power of determining whether
a defendant is competent to appear pro se, but they should not be allowed
to rely on a variable standard which they can apply as befits their mood.
What Constitutes a Waiver of Counsel?
What course of action should the court pursue when a defendant
pleads guity after appearing in court without counsel, uninformed of his
right to counsel and without requesting such assistance? Should the court
conclude that the defendant has waived his right to counsel and accept his
plea of guilty?
Johnson v. Zerbst82 stands for the propositions that a defendant
must "competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel"8 and
that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver .. .
[and] do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."'"
The Johnson decision apparently requires an express manifestation by the
defendant before there can be a valid waiver of counsel. Subsequently, the
Court, in Walker v. Johnston,8" declared that unless a defendant volun-
tarily waives his right to counsel, he will be "deprived of a constitutional
right."86 More recently, in Carnley v. Cochran,8 7 the Court elaborated
upon the voluntary aspect of waiver by saying:
[P]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.
81. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) : Zahn v. Hudspeth, 102 F.2d 759 (10th
Cir. 1939) ; FEDAL RULES 44(a).
82. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
83. Id. at 469.
84. Id. at 464.
85. 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
86. Id. at 286.
87. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
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The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evid-
ence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but in-
telligently and understandably rejected the offer. Anything
less is not waiver.88
The Court has also declared that a waiver is not to be presumed from a
failure to request counsel.8 9
One writer has suggested that one of the questions left unanswered
by Gideon v. Wainwright" is whether the federal court standards as to
waiver of counsel are applicable to state court proceedings."' He suggested
that "an easy finding of waiver in the state courts may substantially
undermine the right guaranteed in Gideon." 2 The Court, in Carnley,
has already asserted that "the principles declared in Johnson v. Zerbst
[are] equally applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in
state criminal proceedings."'" Even without such an express declaration,
it would seem unreasonable for the Court to require the assistance of
counsel in the state courts and at the same time allow these courts to
deprive a defendant of his right to counsel by an "easy" finding of waiver.
LTnless federal standards are imposed upon state courts, the effect of
Gideon is substantially nullified.
When federal standards are applied, a defendant cannot make a
valid waiver until the court has informed him of his right to counsel and
he has made an express, competent and intelligent waiver. "A waiver is
...an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege""' and
should not be inferred from a defendant's failure to request counsel or his
plea of guilty. 5
Assistance of Counsel: The Effect of Request or Waiver
If a defendant either hires counsel or the court appoints counsel,
and during the course of the trial proceedings the defendant decides to
release his counsel and conduct his own defense, is the defendant's prior
request for the assistance of counsel an irrevocable waiver of his right to
appear pro se? In United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey,"' the court
88. Id. at 516.
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
91. Note, Waiver of the Right to Counsel in State Court Cases: The Effect of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1964).
92. Id.
93. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 (1962).
94. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
95. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES §§ 7.2, 7.3 (Tent. Draft 1967).
96. 351 F.2d 429 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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was concerned with whether the failure to request counsel at the inter-
rogation stage97 of the proceedings constituted a waiver of counsel when
such a failure would not act as a waiver at later stages of the proceed-
ings."8 The court stated that "the test of waiver is the same, or should be,
no matter what stage of the proceedings is at issue, so long as the right
[to counsel] has . . .attached."99 The absoluteness of this statement is
questionable. Undoubtedly, there should be an objective minimum stand-
ard for determining whether there has been a waiver.' When the
proceedings have passed beyond the investigatory stage, however, there
is no reason why the standard cannot be raised to prevent any unnecessary
delays in the conduct of the trial. As was pointed out in United States v.
Lanes,' "[j]udges must be vigilant that requests for the appointment
of a new attorney on the eve of the trial should not become a vehicle for
achieving delay.'
01 2
Just as requests for a change of counsel should not be used to
effectuate delay, a defendant should not be allowed to use his right to
appear pro se to achieve delay.' The court in United States v. Bir-
rell'"4 stated that "while the right to proceed pro se is unqualified if
exercised before the trial, the right is 'sharply curtailed after the trial has
commenced with defendant being represented by counsel.' ""' Citing
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno,"'0 the court further stated:
There must be a showing that the prejudice to the legiti-
mate interests of the defendant overbalances the potential dis-
ruption of the proceedings already in progress, with consider-
able weight being given to the trial judge's assessment of this
balance."0 7
The fact that a defendant and his counsel disagree on the course of
97. [WIhen the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus
is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession--our adversary system
begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be per-
mitted to consult with his counsel.
Id. at 436, citing Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U-S. 478, 492 (1964).
98. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
99. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429, 437 (3rd Cir. 1965).
100. A competent and intelligent waiver expressly made by the defendant. This
minimum standard should be operative at all stages of the proceedings after the right to
counsel has attached. See notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text.
101. 374 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1967).
102. Id. at 717.
103. United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 895.
106. 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965).
107. United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1968).
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action to be taken in the defense proceedings would seem sufficiently
prejudicial to the defendant to allow him to discharge counsel and pro-
ceed pro se. The Birrell decision, however, avowed that "a defendant in a
criminal case does not have a constitutional right to an attorney with
whose advice he agrees."' 8 This view seems to give the defendant who
is able to hire counsel greater control over the course of the proceedings
than the indigent defendant who accepts court-appointed counsel. A de-
fendant who hires counsel can choose counsel with whom he agrees, while
an indigent defendant, according to Birrell, can only complain if the
appointed counsel is so ineffective that he does not satisfy constitutional
requirements.'°
In effect, the indigent defendant has no control over his counsel.
Although the attorney-client relationship still exists, the employer-
employee relationship which lingers in the background with hired counsel
is not present. The ability of a defendant to hire counsel should not be the
deciding factor in determining whether the attorney-client relationship
is to continue.
If the delay caused by a defendant's subsequent waiver of counsel is
prejudicial to him and he is aware of this prejudice and is willing to
accept the consequences, it does not seem that the court should weigh this
prejudice in determining whether the defendant can release counsel and
appear pro se. The court should not concern itself with the delay unless it
is prejudicial to itself or other parties.
A situation might also arise where a defendant, prior to the beginning
of the trial proceedings, has waived the assistance of counsel and sub-
sequently requests that the court appoint counsel. Should the delay, which
may result from the request, outweigh a defendant's right to the
assistance of counsel? This situation can be readily distinguished from
that of a defendant who desires to replace counsel and that of a defendant
who wishes to release counsel and appear pro se.
The Sixth Amendment insures the defendant of "the assistance of
counsel for his defence."" '  There is not, however, a requirement as to
when the defendant must request the assistance of counsel. The right
exists at every stage of the proceedings."' Even though the defendant
has previously waived the right to counsel, the right should always be
open to him. The prejudice that would result if the court refuses the
108. United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
109. Id. at 894.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
111. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
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defendant's request for counsel would seem to outweigh any delay that
might result.112
Suggested Methods of Handling Waivers
Reject All Waivers
The simplest course for the courts to follow would be to disallow
all waivers and either appoint counsel or compel the defendant to hire
counsel. The simplicity of this method, however, would not compensate
for its unconstitutionality. The court cannot force counsel upon a de-
fendant who is competent to defend himself. 13 "The dominant motiva-
tion for the insistence that the counsel appear with the defendant is prob-
ably based on the courts' 'fear of reversal . . .rather than concern for the
rights of the accused' . .. .,"" Of course, there are circumstances where
a court will be justified in not accepting a waiver of counsel, but such
rejection should not infringe upon the defendant's right to appear pro se.
Accept All Waivers
The acceptance or rejection of all waivers would result in devastating,
unjust consequences. Some objective standard should be applied in
determining whether a defendant is competent to conduct his own
defense. Those defendants who do not meet the required standard should
be compelled to have counsel present during the course of the proceedings.
One must distinguish between a situation where counsel is forced
upon a defendant who is capable of appearing pro se and one where
counsel is forced upon a defendant who is not capable of conducting his
own defense. The first situation violates the defendant's right to appear
pro se. 5 while the latter is necessary to protect the incompetent defendant.
Accept Waivers Only if a High Standard of Professional Competency Is
Met
Such a proposal would require a determination of the degree of
competency the court would require before allowing a defendant to
appear pro se. In addition to the requirement of physical and mental
competency, should the court also require some degree of professional
competency? The difficulty here is that if the court requires professional
competency, it may prejudice the defendant's right to appear pro se, since
the number of defendants who are capable of attaining this standard will
112. See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text.
113. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
114. Kamisan & Choper, Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and
Legal Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1963).
115. See notes 61-71 supra and accompanying t~xt.
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be greatly restricted.
Difficulty would also be encountered in establishing the criteria to be
used in determining whether a defendant is professionally competent.
The problem would be in determining whether the court should only
measure the defendant's academic knowledge of the law... or whether
it should also consider his practical knowledge of the law." 7
Accept Waivers on the Basis of Mental Competency
In applying this standard, the court would not be required to inquire
into a defendant's familiarity with legal proceedings. Yet, it is question-
able whether general mental competency, or intelligence quotient, will
give a true' indication of a defendant's capability to conduct his own
defense. To be a viable standard, mental competency must at least
include a defendant's ability to comprehend the nature of the charges
against him, the lesser-included offenses, the applicable punishments and
the circumstances in mitigation thereof."' A lack of ability to compre-
hend these factors may exist because a defendant is of below-normal
mentality. Of course, even a defendant of above-average intelligence may
be unable to comprehend complex legal proceedings." 9 This test, there-
fore, would require a detailed preliminary investigation by the court to
determine whether a defendant is capable of defending himself. This
proposal, however, may prove to be impractical because of the increased
burden that it will place on the already over-taxed courts.
Accept Waivers But Require the Presence of Counsel During the Course
of the Proceedings
The methods previously suggested were based on the assumption
that if the waiver is allowed, the defendant would appear alone in court.
The present method would require the presence of an attorney even
though the defendant would theoretically conduct his own defense. The
advantages of this method are twofold. First, the advisory counsel could
help the defendant hurdle the many legal technicalities that are involved
in court proceedings. Secondly, if the defendant should subsequently
decide to have an attorney conduct the defense, the advisory counsel could
step in with little delay or confusion.'
116. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
117. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 239 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
118. See generally Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
119. See Note, The Right of the Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 1133, 1141-45 (1965).
120. One of the reasons that courts have not allowed a defendant to change his
mind during the course of the proceedings is the fear of delay and confusion that might
result from such a switch, See United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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The implementation of this method, however, would involve serious
problems. For this "pure" advisory counsel system to function properly,
the advisory counsel should merely advise and correct the defendant. The
first problem would be in finding attorneys who are willing to act in a
capacity with such restricted powers. The second problem would arise
when the advisory counsel exceeds his power and attempts to dictate the
conduct of the defense. Eventually, the defendant may find himself dis-
placed by his advisor."'
Accept Waivers and Require That the Bench Assist and Advise the
Defendant in the Conduct of the Defense
For this proposal to operate satisfactorily, the bench must be con-
vinced that it has a duty to advise a defendant appearing pro se even
though such a duty would not extend to defendants represented by counsel
or to the prosecution. 2' The court, however, should remain in a
neutral position to dispel any inequities that might arise during the course
of the proceedings. When the court places itself in an advisory capacity,
for the benefit of the pro se defendant, it may undermine both the
adversary and the judiciary systems.
CONCLUSION
There will undoubtedly be instances where a defendant, who has
appeared pro se or has pleaded guilty, will appeal from an adverse verdict
on the grounds that he was denied adequate counsel or was not afforded a
fair trial. The trial court needs to be protected from such allegations, but
its protection need not come from an absolute prohibition against pro se
appearances or from statutes forbidding pleas of guilty to capital offenses.
Rather, the court should protect itself by making a preliminary inquiry
as to whether the waiver of counsel or the plea of guilty was voluntarily,
intelligently and competently made by the defendant.
Since cases involving requests for the assistance of counsel out-
number those involving waivers of counsel and since only a small minority
of the states statutorily forbid pleas of guilty, there is a tendency to forget
that the right to "no counsel" and the right to "no trial" exist. The fact
that these rights are requested less frequently should not deprive them
of equal status. A defendant is entitled to have all of his constitutional
guarantees made available to him. The court, therefore, must not only
assure a defendant of his right to trial and right to counsel, but must also
avert any infringement upon his right to "no trial" and right to "no
counsel."
121. State v. Cappetta, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968).
122. Note, The Right of the Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MixN,. L.
REV. 1133, 1141-45 (1965).
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